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Introduction 
The inclusion of ten post-communist countries into the European Union is probably the best 
indicator of democratic consolidation in these countries. The membership has made 
democracy “the only game in town” in the same way as in the established democracies in 
Western Europe. The new member states have all successfully shown their credentials when it 
comes to democratic government, market economy and the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire. However, despite the fact that citizens new enjoy the same political and civil 
rights as their counterparts in the West, numerous indicators point to the fact that the Central 
and East European countries lag far behind the old West European member states when it 
comes to the performance of the democratic political system and its institutions, especially 
when it comes to corruption (cf. Berg-Schlosser 2004; Karklins 2005; Holmes 2006). 
According to Transparency International levels of corruption in Romania and Bulgaria are on 
par with those of Mexico and Swaziland.1  
 Low quality government and poorly performing political institutions are part of a reality 
that has to be dealt with in everyday life for many people around the globe. For many 
ordinary citizens democratisation implies not only universal political rights and civil liberties, 
but also a hope for a fair political system that can bring an end to corruption and other aspects 
of poor governance. For many East European citizens, however, the harsh reality of 
democratic transition did not match their expectations. And in many cases, they are clearly in 
a position to be able to demand more from their elected representatives and the political 
system in general. Political institutions receive the support and trust they deserve through 
their performance record. And in most post-communist countries the performance of the 
democratic political system has not lived up to even quite humble expectations (cf. Mishler & 
Rose 2001).  
 The result has come to be widespread discontent and distrust in democratic political 
institutions, in some cases to the extent that the legitimacy of the democratic regime could be 
questioned. Being the foundation of democratic legitimacy and an indispensable part of 
democratic consolidation, citizens’ perceptions of the quality of their government and 
institutions constitute an important empirical research question that in fact has received 
surprisingly limited interest from scholars within comparative politics.  
 This paper analyses the relationship between quality of government (QoG) and system 
support in the ten recent post-communist member states of the European Union. More 
                                                 
1 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/regional_highlights_factsheets  
specifically, it focuses on citizens’ evaluations and perceptions about the quality of 
government that is provided by the relatively new democratic regimes. The paper breaks 
down into three main parts. It starts with a discussion of the concept of quality of government 
(QoG) and its relationship with (the quality of) democracy. Then, the empirical analysis 
breaks down into two parts. First, some comparative macro-indicators assessing the QoG in 
the post-communist EU countries are presented. The second part maps out public perceptions 
of two important aspects of quality of government; whether the publics perceive the 
authorities to treat people fairly or not and to what extent the citizens believe public officials 
to be corrupt. In the third part the effects of QoG on support for the democratic political 
system are examined through multivariate analysis.  
 
Conceptualising quality of government 
The last decade has seen a drastic increase in academic studies that have analysed and 
assessed different aspects of political “quality”. In comparative politics, much focus has been 
on “quality of democracy” (Altman & Pérez-Liñán 2002, Baker 1999; Diamond & Morlino 
2005a, Berg-Schlosser 2004; Morlino 2004; Schmitter 2004; O’Donnell et al. 2004; Zielonka 
2007). This research has made an effort to bridge two strands of comparative politics; 
comparative government in advanced democracies and democratization studies. Under the 
umbrella of “quality of democracy” researchers are analysing similarities and differences 
when it comes to the design and performance of democratic systems, both old and new (cf. 
Diamond & Morlino 2005). Another group of scholars – most notably from comparative 
government, political economy and public administration – has made progress in their efforts 
to explain the causes and effects of the quality of government or governance (Rothstein & 
Teorell 2008; cf. Adserá et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2002; Geissel 2008; 
Charron 2009).  
 So how should “quality of government” and “quality of democracy” be conceptualised, 
and how are the two concepts related to each other? A search for “quality of government” on 
Google Scholar returns about 8,000 hits, while a search for “quality of democracy” results in 
4,250 results. When randomly browsing a number of papers that come up, it does not take 
long to find out that there is not much consensus regarding the content of these two concepts. 
Many researchers assign the terms to one or a few statistic indicators, such as the 
Transparency International’s index of perceived corruption, The International Country Risk 
Guide index or the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (cf. Adserà et al. 2003; 
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Bäck & Hadenius 2008; Charron 2009; Charron & Lapuente 2009). Thus, as noted by 
Holmberg et al. (2008, 4) the fact that “researchers and practitioners have not yet arrived at a 
standard definition of what good governance (or QoG) is, different studies adopt different 
interpretations, generating a risk that researchers will employ definitions that best serve to 
confirm their theory”. This is by no means a unique situation in the social sciences, but it 
nevertheless constitutes an analytic problem. Here, the focus will be on QoG, and its 
relationship to QoD is only briefly discussed. 
 
Quality of government as impartiality  
In a recent critique of earlier research, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell propose that impartiality 
in the exercise of public power is the defining feature of quality of government. “When 
implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything about the 
citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” 
(Rothstein & Teorell 2008, 170). Thus, Rothstein and Teorell stress the connection between 
QoG as impartiality (the exercise of public power) at the output side of the political system, 
and political equality on the input side, i.e. the equal possibility of access to power and 
universal suffrage. In order for political institutions to be impartial, they have to rest on a 
basic norm of universalism, where public integrity is understood as equal treatment of citizens 
regardless of the group to which one belongs (e.g. on the basis of ethnicity or sexual 
orientation) (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 87–88).  
 It is important to note that the universality of the principle of impartiality does not imply 
universality when it comes to the content of policies. As Kurer (2005, 223) notes: “Who 
deserves equally, or, alternatively, on which grounds discrimination is ruled out, will be 
answered differently at different periods in time and will vary from society to society”. By 
definition, then, QoG as impartiality rules out all forms of corruption and “particularistic” 
practices such as clientilism, patronage and discrimination. However, as Rothstein and Teorell 
note, although impartiality implies the absence of corruption, the opposite is not necessarily 
true. Nonexistent corruption in a society does not exclude all forms of partial exercise of 
governmental power (Rothstein & Teorell 2008, 171).  
 The conceptualisation of impartiality as the basic norm of QoG places it closer to the 
concept of democracy than most other definitions found in the literature (which often focus on 
corruption, economic and political performance) (cf. Warren 2004). Still, they correctly argue 
that impartiality and democracy is not the same thing, and also that democracy is not a 
sufficient condition for QoG. They do acknowledge, however, that democracy and 
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impartiality do overlap at the conceptual level. Democratic legitimacy requires that political 
and civil rights are secured within a legal framework which must be impartially applied to its 
subjects. Thus, democratic rights must be universal. Moreover, in order for democratic 
elections to be free and fair, they have to be administrated by impartial government 
institutions that do not favour the rulers at the expense of other contestants (Rothstein & 
Teorell 2008, 179–180). Such an uneven political playing field is not very unusual in 
countries that meet only minimal criteria of electoral democracy. Examples are not hard to 
find among the post-communist non-EU countries. Hence, it seems that the conceptualisation 
of quality of government as impartiality also requires a certain degree of quality of 
democracy. 
 
Procedural fairness and legitimacy 
Impartial implementation of political policy and citizens’ experiences from contacts with 
different types of institutions are closely related to the theory, or perspective, of procedural 
fairness. This strand of research argues that it is the fairness of the procedures through which 
institutions and authorities exercise authority which is the key to the willingness of 
individuals to defer to the decisions and rules created and implemented by those authorities 
and institutions (cf. Esaiasson 2005). Procedural fairness is seen as the foundation of 
legitimacy (Tyler 2006). Empirical studies have shown that the legitimacy of political 
authorities and institutions becomes diminished when they do not adhere to norms of 
procedural fairness, not least in recent democracies. For example, Seligson (2002) show that 
procedural injustice in the form of corruption has a significant negative effect on support for 
the political system in general. Consider also Kluegel & Mason’s (2004) analysis of survey 
data from five post-communist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and 
the eastern part of Germany), which shows that perceived fairness is an important factor when 
it comes to people’s evaluations of the political system, both political trust and satisfaction 
with the political system. It should be noted, however, that Kluegel and Mason investigate 
economic fairness rather than the perceived fairness of political institutions. Empirical studies 
of established democracies have pointed to similar results. For example, Kumlin (2004) 
shows that individual experiences from interaction with welfare institutions have a substantial 
effect on trust and social capital in Sweden (cf. Kumlin & Rothstein 2005).  
 From the results of earlier research we may therefore hypothesise a causal chain between 
the citizens’ perceptions of being fairly treated by the government officials occupying those 
institutions, and system support, or the legitimacy of the democratic regime. 
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Comparative macro-indicators of quality of government 
There is an abundance of indicators of QoG related aspects available for the scholarly and 
policy making community. Table 2 presents scores on four governance measures from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (World Bank 2008), which is one of the most 
frequently used data sources in empirical analyses of QoG and QoD. The WGI scores are 
based on a vast array of individual variables drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed 
by 32 different organisations worldwide (Kaufmann et al. 2008). The scores range between 
+2.5 (best) and -2.5 (worst). The indicator in the first column in Table 2 – “voice and 
accountability” – measures the extent to which citizens have the possibility to participate in 
selecting their rulers, as well as political freedoms and media freedom. It also contains data on 
popular perceptions of satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. All countries 
receive positive scores around 1, except for Bulgaria and Romania. The levels have been 
fairly consistent since the first survey in 1996, with small improvements in all countries 
except for Poland and Slovenia. When compared to the mean value for the OECD countries 
(where of course the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are members), the 
average for the post-communist EU member states fall significantly behind. 
 In the second column, scores for “rule of law” are presented. This indicator taps the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. A simple inspection 
shows that Bulgaria and Romania – and to some extent Poland and Slovakia – are lagging 
somewhat behind the rest of the countries. The difference between the post-communist 
countries and the OECD is 1.04, which must be seen as quite substantial.  
 The difference is even more substantial if we look at the corresponding figures for how 
successful the governments are in their “control of corruption” (column 3). This indicator 
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, covering the whole 
spectrum of corruption, from petty acts to state capture. When looking at different indicators 
of political and economic performance, there is not doubt that corruption poses a serious 
problem for all post-communist countries (cf. Holmes 2006; Karklins 2005). In fact, in many 
countries the situation has worsened during the last years. According to the World Bank, 
levels of corruption have increased in half of the countries since 1996. In this respect, 
Bulgaria and Romania once again stand out as laggards among the post-communist EU 
member states, and they have also received serious critique from the EU regarding the anti-
corruption strategies. For example, on 12 February 2009 commission spokesman Johannes 
Laitenberger stated on a press conference that “it is important that the Romanian authorities 
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regain momentum on judicial reform and fight against corruption so as to reverse certain 
backward movements of recent months” (EUobserver.com).  
  
Table 2. Comparative indicators of QoG 2007 (1996 within parentheses) 
 Voice and 
accountability 
Rule of law Control of 
corruption 
Government 
effectiveness 
Bulgaria +0.65  
(+0.11) 
-0.14  
(-0.11) 
-0.22  
(-0.76) 
+0.10  
(-0.94) 
Czech Republic +0.98  
(+0.97) 
+0.77  
(+0.87) 
+0.26  
(+0.58) 
+0.99  
(+0.81) 
Estonia +1.05  
(+0.91) 
+1.00  
(+0.51) 
+0.94  
(-0.02) 
+1.19  
(+0.56) 
Hungary +1.10  
(+1.05) 
+0.74  
(+0.84) 
+0.44  
(+0.63) 
+0.70  
(+0.59) 
Latvia +0.86  
(+0.75) 
+0.57  
(+0.13) 
+0.31  
(-0.65) 
+0.55  
(-0.46) 
Lithuania +0.93  
(+0.93) 
+0.49 
(+0.29) 
+0.17 
(-0.18) 
+0.78 
(-0.35) 
Poland +0.81 
(+0.98) 
+0.28 
(+0.64) 
+0.14 
(+0.39) 
+0.38 
(+0.77) 
Romania +0.47 
(+0.18) 
-0.17 
(-0.15) 
-0.19 
(-0.24) 
-0.09 
(-0.69) 
Slovakia +0.98 
(+0.25) 
+0.35 
(+0.23) 
+0.28 
(+0.40) 
+0.76 
(+0.61) 
Slovenia +1.08 
(+1.10) 
+0.84 
(+0.87) 
+0.90 
(+1.05) 
+1.08 
(+0.81) 
PC EU mean +0.89 
(+0,72) 
+0.47 
(+0.41) 
+0.30 
(+0.13) 
+0.64 
(+0.17) 
OECD mean +1.31 +1.51 +1.72 +1.51 
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2007. 
 
The last indicator in Table 2 measures the quality of public and civil services and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and also the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Thus, to a large extent this measure contains the impartiality of institutions that Rothstein and 
Teorell put forth as the foundation of QoG. However, it also contains information about other 
things that are not directly related to that definition of QoG. Here too, the post-communist 
countries are lagging behind the OECD countries, and within the post-communist group 
Romania and Bulgaria show the worst performance. All in all, the data point to a substantial 
gap in government quality between the new EU member states and the OECD countries. It is 
also clear that the two latest member states, Bulgaria and Romania, have – on all indicators 
presented here – been falling behind the countries that achieved EU membership in 2004.  
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Coping with unfair institutions 
This section turns to comparative data on the micro-level. Moving from the macro- to the 
micro-level of analysis makes it possible to expand the analysis to also include public 
perceptions about quality of government. This approach lets us investigate the causes and 
effects of QoG on a micro level and also its relationship to system support in the new EU 
member states. Taking the norm of impartiality as a point of departure requires that ordinary 
citizens’ perceptions of government performance are taken into consideration. If QoG boils 
down to impartial institutions and implementation of public policy, then public perceptions of 
equal treatment and institutional performance seem like a good place to start.   
 The New Europe Barometer2 – which has been carried out in Central and East European 
countries on a regular basis since 1991 – provides a number of useful indicators of perceived 
quality of government. One item of particular interest to the definition of QoG employed in 
this study is the question whether ordinary people are treated fairly by the authorities. 
Unfortunately this question was only asked in the 2004 survey, which makes us unable to 
investigate if the perceived impartiality of the authorities has changed over time.  
 Figure 1 presents the share of respondents that claim that the authorities treat people like 
themselves fairly. In addition to the EU members, the figure also includes the candidate 
country Croatia as a point of reference. Judging from the data, large segments of the citizens 
in the new EU member states view the authorities as being partial, i.e. not treating all citizens 
even-handedly. Although this standpoint is the prevailing in all countries in Figure 1, there is 
a fair amount of variation between countries. In Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Croatia 
almost half of the citizens perceive the authorities to be behaving fairly, while around 8 out of 
10 citizens in Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia suppose that they 
would not be impartially treated by the government and public officials. It is interesting to 
note the widespread feelings of discontent in Hungary, a country that comes out on the 
positive side when consulting the macro indicators presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The New Europe Barometer (NEB) data analysed in the last part of the paper was collected with the assistance 
of grants from the British Economic & Social Research Council to study diverging paths in post-communist 
countries; the Swedish Tercentenary Fund to Professor Sten Berglund, Örebro University, for work on the Baltic 
States; and from the MacArthur Foundation programme to Professor Michael Marmot, University College 
London Medical School. I am very much indebted to Professor Richard Rose at the Centre for the Study of 
Public Policy, University of Aberdeen, for providing me with the opportunity to use a sample of the data for this 
paper. 
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Figure 1. “Authorities treat people like me fairly”, 2004 (%) 
0
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Slovenia Czech Rep Croatia Estonia Romania Slovakia Latvia Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Hungary
Note: Bars represent percentages that “definitely” and “somewhat agree”. “Don’t know” not included in the 
analysis. 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2004). 
 
Another, closely related, indicator taps the extent to which citizens perceive public officials to 
be corrupt. Indeed, in a system where corruption is widespread among public officials and the 
citizens know about it and act accordingly, the prospects for impartial public institutions are 
slim. In such a system, a “social trap” – a situation where individuals, groups or organisations 
are unable to cooperate due to mutual distrust even though cooperation would benefit all – is a 
more likely outcome (Rothstein 2005). In the end, widespread corruption, and/or a prevailing 
public belief that the political system and its institutions are corrupt, could arguably also have 
dire consequences for democracy itself. If citizens perceive their political representatives and 
civil servants as being devoted to their own enrichment rather than to the public interest, trust 
and support in the democratic political system and its institutions decline, which in the end 
could negatively affect the legitimacy of the system (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Sandholtz 
& Taagepera 2005; Seligson 2002; Norris 1999). 
 From the data presented in Table 2 and in other measures of corruption – such as the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the Nations in Transit index 
– we know that corruption is widespread in the post-communist EU member states, although 
they score high on most measures of democratic development, such as the Freedom House 
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index and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. Those indices are complex 
measures drawing on many sources, for example assessments by experts and business people. 
Here we will use survey data as a complementary measure of the problems of corruption in 
these countries. Figure 2 presents the shares of respondents that in 2001 and 2004 claimed 
that “practically all” and “a majority” of public officials are corrupt. A simple inspection of 
the data reveals that the East European citizens do not display much confidence in their public 
officials. In 2004, a majority in all countries stated that more than half of the public officials 
act in a corrupt manner when exercising their power. When comparing the figures for 2004 
with the survey conducted in 2001, no systematic pattern of change is evident.  
 
Figure 2. “Practically all or a majority of public officials are corrupt” (%) 
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100
Estonia Slovenia Hungary Czech
Rep
Latvia Poland Croatia Slovakia Lithuania Romania Bulgaria
NEB 2004 NEB 2001
Note: Bars represent percentages that state that “practically all” and “a majority” of public officials are corrupt. 
“Don’t know” not included in the analysis. For Croatia, data are available only for 2004. 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2001; 2004). 
 
The levels of distrust are fairly consistent and quite remarkable in most countries, and most so 
in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia where 8 to 9 out of 10 citizens state that more 
than half of the public officials are corrupt. Thus, the poor ratings for Bulgaria and Romania 
in various corruption indices are clearly reflected in the survey data. In fact, the correlation 
between the scores in the World Bank data for 2004 and aggregated levels of perceived 
corruption in the NEB data is very strong (Figure 3) (Pearson’s r = .89 p<.001).  
  
 9
 Figure 3. The relationship between “control of corruption” and aggregate perceived 
corruption 
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Sources: World Bank (2008); New Europe Barometer (2004). (p<.001) 
 
The NEB data do not indicate an increase in quality of government over time in the post-
communist countries, at least not as perceived by the citizens. In fact, in a survey from the late 
1990s a strong majority of Central and East Europeans (an average of 71 per cent) said that 
corruption had become worse compared with the former communist system. 23 per cent 
believed that the level of corruption was about the same, while only 6 per cent of the 
respondents said that the new political and economic system was less corrupt than the old 
(Rose & Haerpfer 1998, 33). 
 So far we have observed a large amount of public confidence in the “corruptness” of 
public officials in general. The data analysed do not distinguish between different institutions, 
however. The question is if all institutions are perceived to be equally corrupt, or if some 
institutions are more distrusted than others. The data collected by the Global Corruption 
Barometer (Transparency International 2007) presented in Table 3 suggest that the publics 
tend to view the corruptness of institutions quite differently. The data confirms the results 
from several studies of institutional trust in the Central and East European democracies that 
have shown that some of the institutions that constitute the basis of representative democracy 
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– political parties and the parliament – are distrusted by large segments of the population 
(Mishler & Rose 1997; 2001; Rose et al. 1998; Linde & Ekman 2005; Lovell 2001).  It is not 
a very bold “guesstimation” to suggest that the high levels of distrust in those institutions 
could stem from the fact that a large majority of the general public view them as being 
corrupt.  
 
Table 3. Public perceptions of corruption’s impact on institutions 2007 (2004 within 
parentheses) 
 Political 
parties 
Parliament Legal 
system/ 
judiciary 
Police Educational 
system 
Medical 
services 
Tax 
revenue 
authorities 
Bulgaria 4.3 (4.3) 4.2 (4.3) 4.3 (4.2) 4.0 (3.7) 3.4 (3.3) 4.1 (3.8) 3.6 (3.5) 
Czech Rep. 3.6 (3.9) 3.4 (3.5) 3.6 (3.5) 3.8 (3.8) 2.9 (2.6) 3.4 (3.0) 2.6 (2.9) 
Lithuania 4.0 (4.2) 4.0 (4.2) 3.9 (4.2) 3.7 (4.1) 2.9 (3.0) 3.9 (3.8) 2.4 (3.5) 
Poland 4.2 (4.2) 3.9 (4.1) 3.8 (4.0) 3.8 (3.9) 3.1 (3.5) 4.0 (4.1) 3.2 (3.5) 
Romania 3.9 (4.2) 3.9 (4.0) 3.8 (4.1) 3.7 (3.8) 3.0 (3.3) 3.7 (3.9) 2.6 (2.9) 
Spain 3.9 (3.8) 3.1 (3.2) 3.0 (3.4) 2.8 (2.9) 2.3 (2.7) 2.2 (2.6) 3.0 (3.4) 
Sweden 3.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.4 1.9 
Note: Question: “To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by 
corruption?” Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 meaning not at all corrupt, 5 meaning extremely corrupt)”. 
Figures are means on the 5-point scale. Data for 2004 are not available for Sweden. 
Source: Transparency International (2004; 2007).  
 
The data presented here indicate that the post-communist EU member states are plagued by 
widespread discontent with and distrust in the way that the public officials are doing their job. 
An overwhelming majority of citizens believe that they have not been or should not be even-
handedly treated by public officials and bureaucrats. This might not come as a surprise when 
considering the fact that the most common perception about public officials is that a majority 
of them are corrupt. An intriguing question is in what way and to what extent public 
perceptions affect the support for the political system, i.e. the legitimacy of the democratic 
regime. The next part empirically investigates the effects of perceptions of quality of 
government on diffuse and specific regime support.  
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Quality of government and system support 
Are people who believe that public institutions are fair and that the officials are not engaged 
in pervasive corruption also more supportive of the democratic regime than those who express 
discontent with the impartiality and performance of the political institutions? If this is the 
case, the governments of the new EU member states have a lot to gain from improving the 
performance of the political institutions. As we have seen, distrust in political institutions 
seems to go hand in hand with perceptions of unfair and corrupt behaviour on behalf of the 
civil servants set out to implement public policy. One important question is what effects this 
has on diffuse support of the democratic political system, i.e. the type of public support for 
democratic principles that many analysts have emphasised as a necessary condition for 
democratic legitimacy, particularly in new democracies (cf. Easton 1965, Lipset 1959; Norris 
1999; Linz & Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Rose et al. 1999). Widespread long-term distrust 
in the performance of political institutions could very well lead to scepticism towards the 
democratic political system as such and in the end affecting negatively the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime.  
 In the following, we will investigate the effect of perceptions of quality of government on 
system support. More specifically, we are interested in two aspects of system support: diffuse 
support for the principles underlying the democratic regime and the more specific kind of 
support for the performance of the democratic system (cf. Norris 1999). Support for 
democratic regime principles will be operationalised as “rejection of non-democratic 
alternatives”. Thus, a person that rejects all the non-democratic alternatives he/she is 
presented with is seen as supporting the current democratic regime.3 In general, this is a 
“tougher” measure of diffuse system support than the frequently used question about whether 
the respondent thinks that democracy is the best form of government or not (cf. Rose et al. 
1998).  
 Support for the performance of the democratic regime is measured here by the question 
about whether of not the respondent is satisfied with the way democracy works. The 
‘satisfaction with democracy’ item is a frequently used indicator in comparative analyses of 
regime support. It has not been utterly clear what the item actually measures, however. It has 
sometimes been used as an indicator of diffuse, or generalised, support, i.e. democratic 
legitimacy. Empirical analyses, however, have shown that it is better suited as an indicator of 
popular support for the perceived performance of the regime, i.e. a more specific type of 
                                                 
3 The non-democratic alternatives are “a return to communist rule”, “having the army rule” and “strong man 
rule” and “suspension of parliament and abolishment of parties”.  
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support (Linde and Ekman 2003; Anderson 2002; Diamond 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi & 
Svensson 1995). Table 4 maps out the levels of support for regime principles and regime 
performance in the ten post-communist EU member states. 
 
Table 4. Levels of diffuse and specific regime support 2004 (per cent) 
 Diffuse regime support Specific regime support Difference diffuse – 
specific support 
Bulgaria 46 20 26 
Czech Republic 61 38 23 
Estonia 65 38 27 
Hungary 72 46 26 
Latvia 54 34 20 
Lithuania 62 41 21 
Poland 43 33 10 
Romania 66 38 28 
Slovakia 58 30 28 
Slovenia 66 68 -2 
Mean 60 39 21 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2004).  
 
The democratic regime enjoys broad popular support, even when support for democracy is 
measured in this way. On average, 60 per cent of the citizens reject all four non-democratic 
alternatives. Only in two countries (Bulgaria and Poland) are those rejecting authoritarianism 
in minority. The levels of specific regime support are considerably lower in general. In 
Slovenia, however, the level of specific regime support outgrows the diffuse support. Slovenia 
is also the only country where a majority of respondents express satisfaction with the way 
democracy works. There is thus a substantial gap between support for democratic regime 
principles and regime performance. This is not unique for post-communist countries. The 
same pattern can be observed in most democracies (Klingemann 1999).  
 Earlier empirical research has pointed to a strong relationship between level of corruption 
and system support, both when it comes to more specific support in terms of public 
satisfaction with the way democracy works (Anderson & Tverdova 2003) and also when it 
comes to diffuse support for democracy and its alternatives (Rose et al. 1998, Mishler & Rose 
2001).  
The regression analyses presented in Table 5 more or less confirm these results and also add 
some further insights about the relationship between perceptions of quality of government and 
system support. The dependent variable in the first regression model is the dichotomy from 
Table 4, taking on the value 1 if the respondent rejects all non-democratic regime alternatives 
and the value 0 if one or more non-democratic alternatives are preferred. The model includes 
four socio-demographic control variables. Education, age and income show statistically 
 13
significant effects, while gender does not. The analysis also includes a number of control 
variables that have shown to be important in earlier studies of system support. Generalised 
trust, perceived economic situation of the household, political interest and satisfaction with 
the market economic system are all positively related to rejection of authoritarian rule. More 
interestingly, however, is that both perceptions of fair treatment and perceived level of 
corruption among public officials show strong and statistically significant effects on diffuse 
regime support.  
 
Table 5: Effects of perceived quality of government on system support (unstandardised logit 
coefficients and standard errors) 
 
 
Independent variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Diffuse regime support 
(Reject non-democratic 
alternatives) 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Specific regime support 
(Satisfaction with 
democracy)  
Fairly treated by authorities (1=definitely, 4=definitely 
not) 
.314*** 
(.033) 
.539*** 
(.034) 
Corruption among public officials (1=almost all, 
4=none or very few) 
.218*** 
(.032) 
.411*** 
(.033) 
Generalised trust (-1=distrust, 0=neutral, 1=trust) .156*** 
(.030) 
.214*** 
(.031) 
Economic situation (1=very bad, 4=very good) .151*** 
(.037) 
.390*** 
(.040) 
Political interest (1=very interested, 4=not at all 
interested) 
.079*** 
(.030) 
.069** 
(.032) 
Rating of current economy (-1=negative, 0=neutral, 
1=positive) 
.328*** 
(.028) 
.238*** 
(.030) 
Income (quartiles, 1=lowest, 4=highest) .182*** 
(.026) 
.051* 
(.028) 
Education (1=minimum, 4=higher academic) .212*** 
(.027) 
-.061** 
(.028) 
Age (in years) -.006*** 
(.001) 
-.010*** 
(.001) 
Gender (1=male) .033 
(.051) 
.028 
(.053) 
Constant -2.061*** 
(.159) 
-3.158*** 
(.170) 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.14 
N 7,304 7,304 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2004).  
 
If satisfaction with the performance of the political system and its institutions, i.e. specific 
system support, constitutes the foundation for democratic legitimacy in terms of diffuse 
system support, then an interesting question is what role public perceptions of QoG play in 
that regard. Can governments nurture public satisfaction with the working of the political 
system by providing just and non-corrupt institutions? The data at hand suggest that this is the 
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case, at least in post-communist democracies. The second model in Table 5 presents a 
regression model similar to model 1, but with satisfaction with democracy as the dependent 
variable. The two “QoG variables” have the strongest effects on satisfaction with democracy 
(b=.54 and .41 respectively). In general, the “performance related” micro-variables (fairness 
of authorities, corruption, perceived household economy, and support for the current 
economic system) have stronger effects on satisfaction with democracy than actual level of 
income. It might seem intriguing that educational level is negatively associated to specific 
regime support. However, it fits neatly in with results from recent comparative research 
showing that better educated citizens tend to be more sceptical towards the performance of the 
political system and demonstrate lower levels of institutional trust (cf. Dalton 2004). The 
trend of growing numbers of “dissatisfied democrat” or “critical citizens” which has been 
observed in established democracies thus seem to have some bearing also on post-communist 
Europe. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression coefficients, the 
results can be transformed into changes in the predicted probabilities on falling into category 
1, i.e. rejecting non-democratic alternatives and expressing satisfaction with the way 
democracy works (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Predicted probabilities of system support 
 Predicted probability 
Values on independent variables Diffuse regime support Specific regime support 
If fairly treated = 1 (definitely not) 0.50 0.24 
If fairly treated = 4 (definitely) 0.72 0.62 
If officials corrupt = 1 (almost all) 0.52 0.27 
If officials corrupt = 4 (very few) 0.68 0.56 
If fairly treated = 1 & officials corrupt = 1 0.45 0.17 
If fairly treated = 4 & officials corrupt = 4 0.80 0.79 
Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regression models in Table 5. The effects of the 
independent variables are calculated when all other variables in the model are held at their mean. 
 
The two central variables have a similarly strong effect on the probability of being a 
“democrat”, i.e. rejecting all non-democratic alternatives. Feeling even-handedly treated and 
having confidence in the impartiality of public officials does not seem to be of critical 
importance. There is roughly 50 per cent chance that also those who do not believe that they 
are being fairly treated, and those who believe that almost all public officials are corrupt, 
express diffuse regime support. The differences are more pronounced when taking the 
combined effect of the two independent variables into consideration which, as we have seen, 
is not an unlikely situation due to the correlation between the two variables.  
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 As indicated in Table 5, perceptions of impartial treatment and corruption are more 
important determinants of specific support. A change in feeling from unfairly to fairly treated 
increases the probability of being satisfied with the way democracy works by 38 percentage 
points (from 0.24 to 0.62). The same move on the “corruption scale” has a slightly weaker 
effect, increasing the probability by 29 percentage points (from 0.27 to 0.56). However, the 
impact on satisfaction becomes really sizeable when looking at the combined effect of the two 
QoG variables on support. A citizen who believes that he or she is being frailty treated and at 
the same time believe very few officials to be corrupt has a probability of almost 80 per cent 
to also be content with the performance of the democratic political system, compared to only 
the marginal probability of 0.17 for the disillusioned citizen (perceiving herself as unfairly 
treated and seeing almost all officials as corrupt).   
 
Conclusions 
This paper has analysed public perceptions of the quality of government in the ten post-
communist EU member states. If quality of government in the end boils down to impartiality 
in the exercise of public power, then there is not much of quality when it comes to post-
communist government. Distrust in public institutions and officials are central features of the 
contemporary post-communist political culture.  An overwhelming majority of citizens 
believe that they are being unfairly treated in their contacts with the authorities. This not very 
surprising considering the fact that also a strong majority of citizens perceive a most of the 
public officials as being corrupt in their implementation of public policy, a fact that mirrors 
earlier studies that have revealed widespread public distrust in political institutions.  
 Why do post-communist citizens perceive their institutions as unfair and the public 
officials corrupt? The obvious answer is of course that the institutions receive the trust and 
support that they deserve based on their performance. A public administration that engages in 
corrupt acts on a regular basis is of course going to be perceived as corrupt by an increasing 
number of persons that are affected by their decisions. The data at hand confirm this. The 
correlation between level of corruption assessed by the World Bank and citizens’ perceptions 
of the extent of corruption among public officials is very strong. The obvious question is thus 
why citizens should trust and support a political system that is corrupt and inefficient.  
 Drawing on earlier studies that have analysed the effect of levels of corruption on system 
support, we investigated in what way citizens’ perceptions of quality of government affect 
support for democratic principles and evaluations of democratic performance. The logit 
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regression analyses demonstrate strong effects of perceptions of QoG on system support. 
Citizens with a positive view of the exercise of public power by the authorities and the non-
corruptness of public officials are clearly more likely to express support for both democratic 
principles and performance. In line with what could be expected, the effect of QoG is 
strongest when it comes to satisfaction with the performance of the political system, i.e. 
specific regime support. However, the importance for support for democracy on a principle 
level – and thus the legitimacy of the political regime – should not be underestimated. 
Considering earlier research (cf. Evans & Whitefield 1995) and the strong correlation between 
support for democratic performance and democratic principles in our data, the strong negative 
effect of perceptions of poor QoG on specific system support could in the long run spill over 
to the level of support for democratic principles and further undermine the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime.  
 The picture demonstrated by the data looks troublesome since it indicates something like a 
vicious circle, where poorly performing and corrupt institutions receive the distrust they 
deserve. And when large parts of the public are feeling that they are being unfairly treated 
they perceive the public officials as corrupt. And when believing that most officials behave 
corrupt they are expecting to be treated unfairly. The widespread distrust in authorities and 
officials is then transferred to the system level, where it affects citizens’ general evaluations 
of the performance of the whole political system. And a long-time record of poor democratic 
performance may very well make extremist political alternatives more attractive. However, it 
is important not to overestimate the consequences for support for democracy and regime 
legitimacy. The democratic regimes in post-communist Europe are in “good” company. 
Trends of declining trust in institutions have been visible in most established democracies as 
well (cf. Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004, however not in the same range as 
in the post-communist countries. In general, post-communist citizens view democracy as the 
best, or the least bad, system of government and the data at hand show that the known 
alternatives are far from enjoying the same support as democracy. In the short run, however, 
the widespread, and in many ways justified, discontent with the performance of the 
democratic institutions and the thriving corruption in new democracies could open up for 
populist and extremist political forces that are trying to take advantage of the situation. 
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